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Coase argued that instead of granting inflexible licenses based on squishy "public interest" priorities--often warped by political influence--the government should simply auction spectrum to the highest bidder. Under Coase's plan, the auction winner would be granted full properties rights to specific frequencies. The owner could then use the spectrum however they saw fit, and could later resell it without government oversight or approval. The government would only step in if serious problems of antitrust arose.

(To ensure government agencies did not hoard spectrum better used by consumers, Coase argued that federal agencies should also be required to pay for their spectrum allocations, even though payment would effectively be to another part of the government, That proposal has never been put into effect; today, federal agencies hold vast swaths of unused or underutilized spectrum, bearing out Coase's concerns.), Spectrum auctions and property rights represented a radical alternative to the system that had been in place even before the FCC was founded in 1934, Before and since, licensees paid little or nothing for the exclusive rights batroom iphone case to frequencies, Allocations are based on transient and often unarticulated views by the agency of what is best for the public interest..

Licenses, however, come with severe limits. Once allocated, frequency allocations are locked into specific applications that often became obsolete. Since the FCC rarely refuses to renew licenses, spectrum became splintered and increasingly inefficient. Without property rights to spectrum, secondary markets for transferring licenses play a limited role in speeding up the change from old to new technologies. For one thing, the FCC must approve all transfers. Even when they do, the new licensee is still bound by all the old restrictions.

Under Coase's plan, spectrum holders wouldn't need a waiver or a formal rulemaking to resell their allocation or use it for new applications, Consumer demand would determine the best use of limited resources, just as it does in unregulated industries, If Dish or LightSquared had an unrestricted right to use their allocation of spectrum to best serve their customers, for example, none of the costly delays and expensive machinations currently gumming up the works would be necessary, Despite these limits, Congress and the FCC ignored Coase's proposals until 1994, when the FCC finally began the process of auctioning spectrum instead of simply giving it away, But the auction winner still only gets a limited-use license, The agency also has a hard time shaking old habits, It often limits auction eligibility to shape the competitive landscape of emerging industries, and attaches unrelated conditions to licenses, Both practices limit the ability of winning bidders to transfer batroom iphone case the license to a future user who might put it to better use..

A market-based solution to possible interferenceOne argument for the FCC's command-and-control system is that it ensures the agency has the ability to police potential interference issues, protecting investments by network operators and consumer device manufacturers. But Coase's property rights proposal also took into account the potential problem of conflicting uses and potential interference and proposed an efficient and elegant alternative. Reviewing the early history of radio, Coase acknowledged that without property rights or regulation of any kind, it wasn't long before chaos reigned. But he also demonstrated that licensing tiny slivers of spectrum and severely limiting its use or transfer was an expensive and inefficient solution to potential interference.